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Structural explanations of the policy outcome should be supplemented 
with a decisional approach,, The units of analysis should not be entire 
countries but specific issues if one wishes to study the causal relation 
between decision process and policy outcome. To characterize the policy 
outcome it is not sufficient to look at monetary and manpower figures»
It seems more interesting to ask to what extent a particular policy outcome 
fulfills the demands of the various societal groups and whether the outcome 
leads to further protests» With regard to the characterization of the 
decision process, broad labelp such as pluralism and neocorppratism are 
too vague. The decision process should be conceptualized as a multi­
dimensional phenomenon with many different decision paths» These paths are 
integrated in a simulation model. A theory is suggested which is based on 
the assumption that decision makers try to optimize the relation among the 
following four values: office seeking, policy goals, system maintenance and 






















































































































































































Most policy studies at the cross-national level take as dependent 
variable aspects of the policy outcome which are relatively easy to con­
ceptualize and to measure such as expenditure levels or the number of 
personnel involved. As first steps in a research enterprise such variables 
certainly have their importance. But from a normative perspective, it seems 
more interesting to ask to what extent a particular policy outcome fulfills 
the demands of the various groups in a population. It is also interesting 
to see how the various societal groups react to a particular policy outcome:
Do they accept the outcome or do they fight it in engaging in protests? Thus,
I will suggest two dimensions for the policy outcome as dependent variable:
(1) demand fulfillment of the various societal groups, (2) protest activities 
once a policy has been implemented.
With regard to the explanatory variables, most cross-national policy studies 
concentrate on structural aspects such as the economic development of a country, 
the party system or the degree of centralization. Here again, the advantage is 
that these variables are relatively easy to conceptualize and to measure. They 
often also have considerable explanatory power. The disadvantage of such struc­
tural variables is, however, that they are difficult to change on a short-term 
basis. Consequently, it is hard to derive relevant policy recommendations from 
such studies. I will suggest, not to replace, but to supplement structural 
explanations of the policy outcome with aspects of the decision process. These 
aspects are often neglected because they are so difficult to conceptualize and 
to measure. If it could be demonstrated that variation in the decision process 
indeed has some independent impact on the policy outcome, the practical rel­
evance of such studies would be significant because many aspects of the decision 




























































































1. Level of Analysis
If we wish to study the impact of variation in the decision process on 
variation in the policy outcome, we must first determine the level of analysis 
of such studies. One possibility is to take entire countries as units of
1)analysis. This approach is used in particular in the consociational theory
2 )and the theory of neo-coporatism . Consociationalism tries to argue that 
major aspects of the policy outcome, in particular political stability, are 
influenced by the prevailing decision mode in a country. Two decision modes 
are distinguished, a competitive mode based on the majority principle and a 
consociational mode in the sense of accommodation and compromise. The neo­
corporate literature is interested in the decision patterns among the state 
and the major economic interest groups. Variation in these decision patterns 
are then linked to specific policy outcomes such as unemployment and inflation.
In another paper, I spelled out the two major difficulties of using entire 
countries as units of analysis (Steiner 1981). One difficulty is that a large 
number of decision processes take place in the various issue areas of a single 
country. No method has as yet been found to aggregate all these decision pro­
cesses in a reliable and valid way for a country as a whole. Both the consociat­
ional and the neo-corporate literature proceed in a rather impressionistic way 
with the result that disagreements about the classification of particular 
countries are frequent. The other difficulty concerns the postu­
lated direction of the causal flows. At the aggregate level of 




























































































that the decision process actually influences the policy outcome. In the con­
sociation,'!' literature, for example, the problem arises how to interpret the 
simultaneous occurrence of consociational decision making and political stability.
The latter is not necessarily the result of the former; the causal relation could 
also go in the other direction or both phenomena could be the result of a third 
factor such as economic affluence.
Causal relations between decision processes and policy outcomes can be 
studied not only at the macro-level of entire countries but also at a very micro­
level of specific decision situations. Together with Dorff, I did this for the
(Steiner and Dorffi 1980)
Free Democratic party in Switzerland. The units of analysis were decision/\
processes about specific disagreements which occurred in particular meetings.
Over a period of 21 months we identified 466 such decision situations in the 
various party gatherings. We characterized each situation by the decision mode 
used to resolve the conflict. Four modes were distinguished: decisions by 
majority rule, decisions by amicable agreement, decisions by interpretation and 
postponements of the decision. The main emphasis of the study was to explain 
variation among the four decision modes. In addition, we also examined how the 
decision mode chosen influenced the policy outcome. We found, for example, that 
majority decisions are most likely to lead to innovative policy outcomes.
There are obvious advantages in using decision situations as units of analysis... 
First of all, no problem of aggregation arises because each decision situation 
can be characterized by a single decision mode and a single policy outcome. Secondly, 
with sufficient access, data collection is relatively easy. In our research of the 
Free Democratic party, we could study all meetings by participant




























































































third advantage of working at this micro-level of analysis is that causal 
relations can be much better established because it is relatively easy to determine 
the temporal flow of the various variables
Despite such advantages there are also severe problems if one studies the 
relations between decision processes and policy outcomes at the micro-level of 
specific decision situations. The biggest problem is that such studies do not 
reveal how a decision process evolves at the societal level over space and time.
The focus is always on specific decision situations but it is not shown how these 
situations are dynamically interlinked. We need a level of analysis where we can 
appropriately specify and investigate this process character of decision making.
Such a level may be found if we take particular issues as units of analysis. The
history of an issue consists of all decision situations which are perceived to 
belong to the same topic. Issues may be defined in broader or narrower terms.
Examples of broad issue definitions are how to decrease the dependence of a 
country on foreign oil or how to alleviate racial discrimination in a society.
Examples of narrower issue definitions would be whether to increase taxes on 
gasoline or whether to grant tax exemption to racially segregated schools. I suggest 
that it is preferable, at least at the beginning, to work with relatively narrow 
issue definitions. In this way, the problem of measurement still seems fairly 
manageable. For a broad issue like the alleviation of racial discrimination in a 
country the overall policy outcone would have to be aggregated from a great number 
of more specific policy outcomes. If the issue is more narrovrly defined, the aggregation 
problem is obviously less severe. The same holds true for the decision process. With 
a broadly defined issue there is likely to be an overwhelmingly high number of de­
cision situations in a great variety of arenas so that the measurement process 




























































































question of gasoline tax it seems more feasible to delimit and to aggregate all 
decision situations dealing with the issue.
Taking narrowly defined issues as units of analysis does not preclude 
the possibility of later work on broader issues. For example, a large set of 
narrowly defined health issues can later be aggregated for the health field as
i - a whole. As a general principle, I postulate as an optimal research strategy that 
work continues simultaneously at many different levels of analysis. This means 
that despite my earlier criticism, work should continue at the macro-level 
of entire countries and at the micro-level of specific decision situations. Com­
paring decision processes and policy outcomes for entire countries certainly has 
the weakness that the data will be rather impressionistic and "soft". But as 
the literature on consociationalism and neo-corporatism indicates, working at the 
level of entire countries sharpens the eye for broad normative questions such as
j
tfie conditions of political stability or the possibility of repression of the de­
mands of certain groups. Small-group research at the level of specific decision 
situations, on the other hand, runs the risk that these broad normative questions 
are often screened out in the minute details of the analyses. But research at 
this micro-level helps us to sharpen our conceptual and theoretical tools because
we are much closer to a "hard" data base.R
I
Research at a middle level with issues as units of analysis has been severely
neglected till now so that a certain emphasis at this level is needed. There were,
of course, always case studies of particular issues, but they were mostly descriptive
and atheoretical in orientation. Khat we need is a common conceptual framework






























































































countries. In order to analyse systematically the causal relation between decision
process and policy outcome, we should have studies which compare an issue X for a
fairlv large number of countries. It would also be fruitful if a large number of
issues could be studied within the constant parameters of a particular country.
Having discussed the question of the units of analysis, we shall address in
the next two sections the problem how to conceptualize and to measure first the policy 
Lhonoutcome and^the decision process. The fourth and last section will conclude with 
a theoretical discussion of the possible casual linkage between decision
processes and policy outcomes.
2. Policy Outcome
If the units of analysis are issues, how shall we conceptualize the policy 
outcome? The easiest solution is to seek the conceptualization at a very concrete 
level. This'was done by Boulter (1980) who compared the issue of speed limits 
on highways in the US, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic after the oil 
crisis of 1973. With regard to the policy outcome, he simply asked whether and 
how quickly a country imposed speed limits, what form these limits took and whether 
they were removed again when the greatest emergency of the oil crisis was over.
Variation in these aspects of the policy outcome were then explained by variation 
in the decision process in the various countries. A conceptualization of the policy 
outcome at such a concrete level seems useful and appropriate if one is merely 
interested in the question of speed limits.
But if we wish to generalize over more than one issue, a more abstract 
conceptualization of the policy outcome is obviously needed. One has to find 
categories under which the policy outcome of a large number of issues can be 
subsumed. An often chosen strategy is to compare public expenditure levels for 



























































































great advantage that data are usually readily available. Expenditure levels may 
also say something about the priorities of the decision-makers. Quite often, how­
ever, one has the suspicion that the policy outcome is conceptualized in monetary 
terms because the data are so easy to collect. I have no fundamental objection to 
such, research enterprises but it should be carefully justified why it is interesting 
to conceptualize, the policy outcome in monetary terms.
I have a similar complaint if the policy outcome is conceptualized in terms 
of manpower put into a program. Such studied may ask how many teachers a country 
has per pupil or how many doctors and nurses per patient. I recognize that such 
data may tell us more about what actually happens to the pupils and the patients 
of a country than if we are referred only to budget figures. The suspicion never­
theless often remains that this conceptualization of the policy outcome is mainly 
chosen because the data are easily available. Figures about the number of teachers 
do not toll us how good these teachers are and what they actually do with their 
pupi1s.
I wish to suggest two dimensions'of the policy outcome which I will try to 
justify from the perspective of a normative democratic theory. This justification 
will be presented after the description of the two dimensions. One dimension 
derives from the view of the citizens, the other from the view of the political 
system. Seen from the citizens, a central dimension of the policy outcome seems 
whether it fulfills their demands. For the functioning of a political system 
it seems crucial whether a policy outcome is commonly accepted or whether it leads 
to protests and new demands. These are two separate dimensions because losing 
citizens will not necessarily protest and sometimes citizens may engage in protest 
behavior even if they got what they asked for. Figure 1 describes the space formed 









































































































Let us now take a closer look at the two dimensions and the four cells which 
fern if we divide each dimension in two halves. With regard to the dimension of 
demand fulfillment, one has to identify at first the various groups which raise 
demands for a particular issue. For each group then, one has to determine what 
these demands are. Sometimes, this may not be an easy task because a group may 
speak with different voices. There is also the problem that for tactical reasons 
a group may exaggerate its demands. However difficult in a concrete case, care­
ful investigations should reveal in a rough form what the various groups demand 
in a particular issue. The next step is to determine to what extent each group 
gets what it wants. This is all what is needed to classify the groups on this 




























































































and winners or they may all win in some aspects and lose in others.
For the protest dimension one has to conceptually distinguish between protests 
during the decision process and protests which occur after a decision is made 
and implemented. For figure 1, only the latter aspect is relevant. We wish to 
know whether some of the groups react to the policy outcome with any kind of protest 
behavior. These protests may range from press releases to vast street demonstrations. 
For this dimension too, the classification of the individual groups is not easy but 
also not insurmountable because we can rely on empirical evidence.
It is easier to speak about the space formed by the two dimensions if we dis­
tinguish the four cells depicted in figure 1. Two of these cells, the non-protesting 
winner's and the protesting losers, do not need further comments. An interesting 
category are the non-protesting losers. From a behavioral point of view, they form 
a single type characterized by the fact that they do not get what they wanted but that 
they do not engage in any big protests. The motivation for this common behavior, 
however, may be very different. One can think at least of the following motivational 
bases:
1. Acceptance of the formal and informal rules by which the issue
. - , ■ " ; * • » .
was decided.
2. Confusion about who won and who lost.
3. Intimidation.
A. Resignation.
5. Lack of skills to organize a protest.
6. Low saliency of issue.
An interesting category are also the protesting winners. Why would a group 
engage in protests if it gets what it wants? In recent years, such occurrences 




























































































for publically-funded concert hall. Even if this demand is fulfilled, the
grou;. may continue to express dissatisfaction because this specific demand was merely 
a symbol for a much wider and diffuse dissatisfaction. Thus, it is conceivable that 
the winners for a particular issue show no satisfaction at all but continue to engage 
in pretest behavior.
Having described two dimensions of the policy outcome, I have to justify why 
these dimensions allow to raise interesting normative questions. A first set of 
questions is raised by the distribution of the various societal groups in the four 
cells.
If we adher to a harmony model of society in the sense of Parsons (195'1) , 
we probably wish that the losers accept their defeat and remain quiet. But from a 
coufLictual model of society in the sense of Coser (1956) and Dahrendorf (1959), one would 
probably encourage the losers to continue the fight. Particularly intriguing questions 
are raised by the category of protesting winners. Their diffuse and perhaps anomic 
protests may appear to many as threatening the stability of a political system. But 
others may applaud these protesters who refuse to be co-opted by the establishment 
of the system. The argument could be that any society has the tendency to moderate 
marginal groups in allowing them some small victories in narrowly-delimited issues.
A further set of normative issues comes up if we question whether the demands 
of the citizens correspond to their true needs. Such questions may lead to doubts 
who the real winners and losers are. Take as an illustration a demand by young 
blacks in the US to increase the minimum hourly wage. If such a demand is met, one 
may ask whether young blacks are really the winners or whether such an increase 




























































































On the other hand, one nay argue that young blacks are exploited in the labor market 
if minimum wages do not keep up with inflation. Thus, where are the true needs of 
this group? h'e do not have to pursue this question in the present context. I simply 
wish to make the argument that demands do not necessarily correspond to needs and 
that our research should encourage a normative discussion about the relation between 
demands and needs. Such a discussion also allows to address the question of non-
decisions in the sense of Bachrach and Baratz^^^According to these authors we
{
should be concerned with the mechanisms which prevent certain groups to raise their 
demands in the political arena or even to become conscious what their demands should
be.
3. Decision Process
For some time now there has been a heated debate in the literature about the 
relative importance, of political and socio-economic variables for the explanation 
of policy outcomes. The socio-economic variables ere often referred to as struc­
tural, the political variables as dynamic. This distinction leads to a meaningful 
theoretical question, namely to what extent the policy outcome is determined by 
underlying structural features or by day-to-day dynamic processes. Answering this
question would tell us more about the means to influence the policy outcome. Can
exclusively
the policy outcome  ̂ be influenced in the long-run through a slow' change in
the structural features of a country, or is it also possible to arrive at signifi­
cant short-range changes through manipulation of process variables?
Although the distinction between structural and process variables is meaning­



























































































I agree with Castles1 (1981 p 129) recent critique ’’that the type of political factors
often analysed in the 'politics matters' debate are as structural in character as 
the socio-economic factors with which they are contrasted." The party system or 
the decree of political centralization for example, have to be considered as struc­
tural features because they are usually not open to short-range changes. Politi­
cal process variables should refer only to the day-to-day interactions among the 
decision makers, how they move an issue from arena to arena, the coalitions and 
bargains they form, the modes with which they make their decisions and the way 
these decisions are implemented. Such process variables have largely been neglec­
ted for the explanation of policy outcomes. A first reason for this neglect is
that it is so difficult to conceptualize and to measure political process variables.
(p.129)
This point is explicitly made by Castles^whose "view is not that agency is unimpor­
tant, but rather that it is frequently difficult to come to grips with its manifes­
tation in individual choices, strategies and manoeuvres by means of the inherently 
generalizing methods of the social sciences. It is quite impossible in the context 
of cross-national comparative studies, which seek to describe and explain highly 
aggregated patterns of political behavior." Castles concludes that "this leaves 
the proper study of policy outcomes as the description of varying patterns of 
policy and the location of the structural relationships which underlie them."
My answer to Castles is that we could lower the level of aggregation in comparing 
not entire countries but specific issues, a research strategy which I outlined in 
the first section of this paper. With issues as units of analysis, it should be 
easier to cone to grips with the problem of how to measure political process 
variables.
A second reason for the neglect of political process variables is that many 
authors assure that these variables are rather irrelevant for the explanation of 





























































































surface phenomenon which is relatively unimportant compared with the 
structural features of a country. Such authors often feel well above 
the work of journalists who are supposedly concerned merely with the 
everyday trivia of politics. The academic should at least be open to 
the possibility that political process variables matter for the policy 
outcome.
From a third perspective, political process variables are neglected 
because they are assumed to function merely as a transmission belt bet­
ween structural variables and the policy outcome. According to this 
view, process variables are not trivial but they are so much a product 
of the structure that they have no independent effect of their own. 
Consequently, studying process variables has no great practical signi­
ficance because they can anyhow be influenced only through changes in 
structural variables. Thus, the causal linkage between structure and 
policy outcome is often treated as a blackbox. I do not deny that the 
structure often places strong constraints on the decision process. But 
the strength of these constraints may vary from situation to situation. 
In my research with Dorffi (Steiner and Dorffi p p .79-33), we found that 
in small groups of high-status actors there is a strong social pressure 
to resolve conflicts by amicable agreement and not by a majority vote.
In such situations, the actors seem to be exposed to strong constraints
by structural features. But, we found other situations which were much
more indeterminate in their constraints so that there was more room
for random factors and free choice by the actors. We should be 




























































































a high degree of indeterminancy by structural factors. In this way, we can 
identify the cases where it is worthwhile to recommend to the politicians a particu­
lar decision-making behavior in order to reach a particular policy goal.
Thus, my overall position is not that decision-makers are at liberty to choose 
whatever behavior they wish. There are certainly always structural constraints. 
But I assume that in some situations the constraints are sufficiently weakened so 
that it makes sense to look at the decision process as an independent variable in 
its own right.
My overall arguments lead me to the following framework for the explanation 
of policy outcomes.
Figure 2
Framework for the explanation of policy outcomes.
The arrow from the decision process to the policy outcome indicates the postulated 
causal relation which is my prime interest. But the figure shows also that the 
policy outcome may be influenced directly or indirectly by structural variables. 
The influence of the structure may by-pass the decision process altogether. Here 
it is of particular interest that structural features may determine the issues 
put on the political agenda, an argument already discussed in the context of the 




























































































'..licit is the distinction between structural and process variables? Compared 
with the day-to-day dynamic of the decision process the structure is relatively 
stable although in the long-run it will of course change too. In my conceptuali­
zation, structure is a very broad umbrella factor with the nature of a residual 
category to the process factor. Structure encompasses (1) the political institut 
ions, (2) the socio-economic setting, (3) the culture, and (4) the international 
content. These various structural features are certainly related with each other 
but this is not of immediate interest in the current content. I merely wish to 
indicate that there are many competing explanations to the postulated causality 
between the decision process and the policy outcome.
So far, I referred to the decision process in a relatively unspecified
way. If we really wish to open this "black box", we must make it much more 
specific how we wish to conceptualize the elements of this process.
In a first attempt I started with broad labels such as pluralism and
neo-corporatism which are often used in the literature to characterize
decision processes0 In our research group we tried to classify the
3)decision process about specific issues according to such labels.^ 
Unfortunately, this was a frustrating and ultimately fruitless enter­
prise. We found that labels such as neo-corporatism have a great number 
of different definitions and that many of these definitions are too vague 
if applied to concrete decision processes. Consequently, it was im­
possible to determine in a reliable way which cases corresponded for 
example to a pluralist or a neo-corporatist decision process,,
We then decided to take another research strategy., Rather 
than to characterize an entire decision process by a single label, we 
recognized that such a process is a multidimensional phenomenon with 
many possible combinations among its elements. For the time being, it 
seems useful to call these combinations simply by neutral numbers such 




























































































way to a more general theory of decision making than many of the 
current theories which are often too much linked to specific labels0
In order to reduce the complexity of the decision process, 
we selected eight variables which we thought to be of greatest importance. 
There is of course nothing sacred about this choice, and I present this 
solution merely as an illustration of the general approach. The combination 
of these eight variables leads to specific decision paths. These paths are 
integrated in an overall simulation model. Like in any simulation, the 
logical order is important in which the variables follow each other. Here 
again, different choices are possible and I give our specific choice only 
as an illustration.
tie assume that the first step in the decision path is the identification 
of the societal groups which are the dominant actors in the decision 
process, 'tie distinguish (1 ) political parties, (2) functional interest 
groups, (3) regional groups, and (4) cultural groups. As second step in 
the simulation model, we ask for the major cleavage among the societal 
groups identified in step 1. For political parties, for example, the 
distinction is between (l)left/right, (2 )clerical/anticlerical, and 
(3)traditional/modern. The third step deals with the level of participation 
within the individual societal groups. This participation may be (l)limited 
to the top leaders, (2) extend to the activists, or (3 ) encompass also 
the masses. Fourthly comes the question to what extent the state participates 
through its bureaucracy in the decision process. The role of the state 
bureaucracy may be (1 ) dominant, (2 )co-equal to the societal groups, or 
(3)weak. The next two steps have to do with the arenas of the decision 
process, and here we inquire to what extent these arenas are institutio­
nalized and visible to the public eye. The seventh step asks for the pre­




























































































on the four categories already mentioned in section 1 of this paper: 
(l)decision by majority rule, (2)decision by amicable agreement,(3 ) 
decision by interpretation, and(*0postponement of the decision,, The last 
step covers the phase of implementation and asks to what extent the 
societal groups identified in step 1 participate in the implementation 
of the decision.
Figure 3 gives two hypothetical decision paths derived from the simulation,,
Figure 3
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Strong involvement of 
societal groups in 
implementation
From the perspective of a parsimonious and elegant theory, one may object 
that such a simulation model will result in an unwieldy high number of 



























































































many paths are empirically empty or near-empty so that they can be 
neglected. If the main actors are regional groups and the state 
bureaucracy is heavily involved it is unlikely in most Western 
democracies that the decision process will take place in highly 
institutionalized and publicly visible arenas. Thus, these paths may 
be disregarded for further analysis. Secondly, it is not necessary for 
each path to include the information on all eight variables, because a 
lower number of variables may already sufficiently determine the policy 
outcome. Eliminating in this way redundant information reduces strongly
u )the number of decision paths which have to be included in the analysis.
^ «T h a o ry
Theoretically, the task is to find logical arguments which can link 
variation in the decision paths to variation in the policy outcome.
This logic must be based on some basic assumptions about the values 
which the decision makers try to maximize. I assume that the following 
four values are of prime importance to decision makers.
- Seeking political office.
- Implementing policy goals.
- Maintaining the political system in which they operate.
- Minimizing the opportunity costs of time invested in a 
particular decision process.
It is further assumed that the relative weight of the four values is 
not a constant but varies as a function of the path which a particular 
decision process takes. In addition, structural features may have to be 
introduced as parameters into the theory. These assumptions are depicted


































































































Within this framework) we currently test a set of hypotheses using 
about 70 issues from the energy field in seven Western countries,, ^
In the present context, space does not allow to present these hypotheses 
in detail. But to indicate the direction in which we go,figure 5 
gives the policy outcome which we expect for the two decision paths 
described in figure 3 * The dots in the two-dimensional space represent 



























































































For both examples there are six societal groups.
Figure 5




For decision path 1, there are three clear winners and three clear 
losers and the losers protest against the policy outcome. For path 2, 
on the other hand, there are no clear winners and losers and no group 
engages in protests against the outcome. The explanation for this 



























































































-  21 -
in the two cases. It is hypothesized that office seeking is the main 
value for decision path 1 , system maintenance for decision path 2 .
In the present context, it is not necessary to further justify these 
hypotheses because they serve merely illustrative purposes. To finish 
this theoretical discussion,I wish to make a short reference to the 
potential importance of structural parameters. The hypotheses which are 
formulated at first in a universal way may hold for some countries 
but not for others, for example only for small countries but not for 
large ones. This would mean that we would have to introduce the size of 
a country as a structural parameter into the theory. ^
I hope that the introduction of such parameters will help
to formulate relevant recommendations for the decision makers of
specific countries. At first, one would have to discuss with these
decision makers the desired policy outcome. According to temperament,
the scholarly adviser may or may not wish to influence these goals from
7)a normative perspective. Once the policy goals set, the adviser may 
refer to other countries with similar structural features and indicate 
for what decision paths these goals were reached. Because
many of the elements of the decision process are relatively open to 
short-term changes, such a collaboration between political scientists 
and political decision makers may have an immediate policy impact. 
Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on the 
Future of Party Government, Convened by Rudolf Wildenmann, Florence, June 
1982. The paper is based on research supported by a grant of the Swiss 
National Science Foundation. I received helpful comments from Robert Dorff, 
William Keech, Peter Lange, Franz Lehner, Arend Lijphart,
Duncan MacRae, Bingham Powell, George Rabinowitz, Ford Runge, Donald 



























































































1. For the most detailled presentation of the consociational theory 
see Lijphart(1977)o
2 0 For a good review of the literature on neo-corporatism see 
Diamant(1981)o
3o See in particular the unpublished papers by Daniel Gerber and Patrick 
Nussbaum, graduate students at the University of Geneva, and Claus 
Hofhansel, graduate student at the University of North Carolina.
For an application of this method see Steiner and Dorff(1980).
5. The time framework is 1973 to the present and the countries are 
United States, Great Britain, France, Federal Republic, Italy, 
Austria, and Switzerland.
6 . For the importance of the size of a country as a structural 
parameter see Dahl and Tufte(197^)•
7. For a discussion of such influence see MacRae(1976).
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